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Abstract
The impacts on public transit ridership of changes in gasoline prices and service levels 
have been studied, while the combined effects of gasoline price changes under differ-
ent levels of transit service have not. This paper discusses a consumer welfare calcula-
tion based on a binary mode choice model for commuters in idealized corridors with 
varying public transportation levels of service. Welfare losses are seen to be greatest 
for commuters in corridors with poor public transit options, and losses increase with 
rising gas prices. Low-income commuters are seen to suffer more welfare loss in cor-
ridors with low-performing transit options than in corridors with well-performing 
public transit systems. This simple model points to the need for more research regard-
ing the impact of high gas prices on low-income households’ commute behavior and 
access to jobs. 
Introduction
In the Phoenix metropolitan area, for most trips, door-to-door travel times by 
public transportation can be three to five times as long as by automobile. The 
transit mode share for work trips there is less than half of that of the U.S.— 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2010
2
2.3 versus 4.8 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2005-2007). Even travelers from most 
of the poorest households are “captive” drivers, having few other reasonable travel 
options. A total of 6.2 percent of households have no vehicles, much lower than 
metropolitan areas of similar size, such as Baltimore (11.4%), Philadelphia (13.6%), 
and Boston (12.5%) (U.S. Census Bureau 2005-2007). Generally speaking, then, 
the increase in gas price likely represents a more significant welfare loss from the 
population in Phoenix than in the other cities, since the choice to avoid payment is 
not a reasonable option for most. An interesting set of question arises: How would 
losses in cities with poor public transit options compare to the losses for com-
muters in cities with better transit options? Would low-income and high-income 
commuters suffer similar losses? Would low-income households suffer less in a city 
with better transit options? This paper explores these questions using an existing 
binary mode choice model to analyze different commuting mode choice scenarios 
with changing gasoline prices. Before proceeding to our analysis, the context for 
this area of questioning is further discussed. 
Gas Prices and Low-Income Travel 
Concern for low-income workers’ access to jobs has been a central one in urban 
research over the past half-century, especially as it relates to metropolitan 
decentralization (the spatial-mismatch hypothesis), welfare reform, and access 
to transportation. Access to jobs is indeed found to be influenced by access to 
transportation. Some work emphasized the role public transit systems could have 
in providing needed access to overcome the spatial-mismatch problem (Sanchez 
1999), while many studies questioned these conclusions. Taylor and Ong (1995) 
and Gurley and Bruce (2005) emphasized the importance of automobile access in 
explaining job accessibility, renaming the spatial mismatch as one of “automobile 
mismatch.” Others confirmed the “automobile mismatch” conclusion and ques-
tioned public transit’s effectiveness for job accessibility compared to the automo-
bile (Ong and Blumenberg 1998; Wachs and Taylor 1998). Cervero et al. (2002) and 
Sanchez et al. (2004) found that public transit access was largely insignificant in 
affecting employment likelihoods for former welfare recipients. 
The review of the Spatial Mismatch research by Ihlanfeldt and Sjonquist (1998) 
shows that none of the studies incorporated out-of-pocket costs as an element of 
transportation costs; costs were either spatial or temporal. Rogers (1997) found 
that the results for employment access predictions are sensitive to the specifica-
tion of accessibility models, however. If this is the case, could a rise in gasoline 
prices add significantly to time costs that were thought to be the main component 
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of travel costs? This issue may not have mattered during the periods of historically-
low gasoline prices, but prices are unlikely to remain as stable or as low in the 
future (EIA 2009). Figure 1 shows the dataset years for the job access research 
superimposed on annual average gasoline prices in the U.S. Note that gasoline 
prices were below $2 per gallon (2008 dollars) from 1985 to 2005, the period dur-
ing which a bulk of the job access research was performed. 
Thus, the question should be asked: How might rising marginal costs of automo-
bile operation affect job access? Clearly, ownership costs are significant barriers to 
overcome for low-income households. Now, with rising or volatile gasoline prices, 
marginal costs may become more significant and affect the ability to use vehicles 
for commuting. This adds a new dimension to the mismatch problem of accessibil-
ity cost and may impact employment outcomes, resulting policy emphases, and 
the “automobile mismatch” conclusion. These issues are explored in this paper 
using several choice scenarios to model the impacts gasoline prices may have on 
commute mode choice and the welfare of low-income commuters. 
 
Key to studies: 1: Cervero et al. 2002; 2: Gurley and Bruce 2005; 3: Ong and Blumburg, 1998; 4: Ong, 2002; 
5: Sanchez, 1999; 6: Sanchez et al., 2004; 7: Taylor and Ong, 1995 (Energy Information Agency, 2010)
Figure 1. Dataset year for spatial mismatch studies focused on  
transportation mode superimposed on annual average  
unleaded gasoline prices, 1975 to 2009
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Study Approach 
Some hypotheses concerning the interaction between welfare, transit service 
levels, income, and fuel prices can be stated a-priori: under rising fuel prices, wel-
fare losses in places with poor transit options will be greater than in places with 
good transit, low-income populations will suffer more as a share of income, and 
low-income households will suffer less in places with better transit options. While 
these conclusions may seem obvious, no studies have addressed these simple 
questions. 
In this paper, these interactions between transit service, income and fuel prices are 
explored by developing commute scenarios and comparing their modeled welfare 
changes. For an example choice utility function and representative 10-mile com-
mute, the choice model calculates choice and welfare changes under changing 
gasoline prices. Three models are set up for three public transit “levels of service,” 
representing, loosely, a commute trip in a corridor with few reasonable transit 
options; a corridor with reasonable transit options compared to driving where 
access, travel times, and out-of-pocket costs are competitive; and a corridor where 
public transit access and travel times are significantly faster than driving options. 
First, the specific performance assumptions and choice model are presented. Next, 
the scenarios are evaluated for commuters of different income levels to compare 
how welfare impacts differ for them under the different level of transit service 
scenarios. Before proceeding to the scenarios, previous work concerning the inter-
actions between welfare, fuel prices and mode choice is reviewed. 
Background
The National Research Defense Council (David Gardiner & Associates 2007) 
alluded to the idea of connecting transit quality with the impacts of fuel price 
changes when they sought to identify which U.S. states’ drivers were most “vulner-
able” to oil dependency, measured by the share of the residents’ incomes spent on 
gasoline. The most vulnerable states tended to be more rural, such as Mississippi, 
or had large urban areas with few public transit options, such as Georgia and Ari-
zona. The least vulnerable states, such as New York and Massachusetts, have large 
cities with well-performing public transit systems. While such aggregate measures 
lose the detailed connection between mode choice and transportation character-
istics, they point to a connection between urban form, transit quality, and gasoline 
price impacts on economic welfare. 
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The two underlying issues of interest here are the interactions between gasoline 
price and mode choice, and the estimation of welfare changes resulting from 
these price and mode choice changes. The impacts of various cost factors such as 
parking, fuel, and transit fare prices on transit ridership are well studied (Bhat el al. 
2009; Litman 2004; Mattson 2008; Taylor and Fink 2003; Wang and Skinner 1984). 
Cross-elasticity estimates for transit ridership due to gasoline price differ in the 
short and long timeframes and by type of transit technology (Mattson 2008). Esti-
mates of short-run elasticities typically fall below 0.15, while longer-run estimates 
ranged from 0.12 to 0.4 (Mattson 2008). 
The issue of gas price effects on ridership within a context (though unspecified) of 
transit quality is brought up indirectly by two recent studies by Currie and Phung 
(2007) and Haire and Machemehl (2007). Currie and Phung (2007) estimated the 
ridership elasticity with respect to gas price based on national total ridership data 
while removing new system expansions from their dataset. They find ridership 
elasticities for bus, light rail and heavy rail to be 0.04, 0.27 and 0.17, respectively. 
Using a different approach, Haire and Machemehl (2007) estimate the same 
three elasticities (actually correlations) to be 0.24, 0.07, and 0.27. Instead of using 
national data, they focus on five large cities: Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco, and Washington, D.C. 
It may be difficult to determine exactly why such opposing results were found, but 
they do point to some interaction between transit quality and mode choice under 
changing fuel prices. Looking at the results for bus, the cities’ in the Haire and 
Machemehl (2007) study have substantial bus systems with service levels which 
may enable a realistic alternative for large segments of the population, resulting in 
a larger choice response to gas price changes. For the national data used in Currie 
and Phung (2007), it may be that bus systems do not, nationally, offer good choice 
options, and so elasticities were found to be especially low. Understanding the dif-
ferences in the rail elasticities would take a more specific analysis of the systems 
studied.
Numerous studies have estimated welfare impacts from price and choice changes 
in transportation policy realms (Hau 1987; Mannering and Hamed 1990; Niskanen 
1986; Small and Rosen 1981; Pines and Sadka 1984). Several studies use analytical 
welfare calculations to find that welfare in general falls as prices rise. Pines and 
Sadka (1984) developed a simple analytical urban commute model that combines 
gas prices and congestion tolls to show that increasing gas prices reduce welfare, 
and that congestion tolls should be reduced in order to remain optimal. Similar 
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results are found for the case of Iranian domestic gasoline consumption under ris-
ing gasoline prices (Ahmadian et al. 2007). Hau (1987) looked at different transit 
levels of supply and their effects on consumers’ welfare, but did not test changing 
gas prices as an independent variable. 
Methodology
The approach here is to model user economic welfare before and after gasoline 
price changes. The calculation is made for three corridor “scenarios” representing 
different levels of public transit service relative to automobile level of service. The 
welfare changes of commuters of different income levels are calculated and com-
pared under the three scenarios. Note that this approach is not based on empirical 
or analytical work, but uses an existing choice model to analyze idealized choice 
scenarios and welfare impacts. These welfare calculations are described here, fol-
lowed by the construction of the three corridor scenarios.
Welfare Calculation
In the microeconomic model of mode choice, consumers of transportation derive 
satisfaction, or “utility,” from each of the mode choices available to them. For con-
sumer n, the utility derived from mode choice i, can be represented as Vin(Xin, Zn,), 
where V is called the indirect utility function, Xin are attributes of the mode and 
the particular trip (such as fare or travel time), and Zn are consumer’s socioeco-
nomic characteristics (such as age or income) (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The 
“compensating variation” (CV) is a standard estimate of welfare change resulting 
from a policy change (Hanemann 1999). The logit discrete choice formulation 
conveniently contains the expected maximum utility derivable from a choice set 
through the “log-sum” (denominator) term, , for consumer n, 
where i is the index of choices in the choice set. The standard derivation of the CV 
within the logit discrete choice formulation effectively calculates the difference 
between the expected utilities with and without a policy intervention (Small and 
Rosen 1981). Here, the expected CV for consumer n is:
,    (1)
Where, λn is the marginal utility of money for consumer n, and where 1 and 0 
are the “states” with and without the policy intervention, such as a price change, 
respectively (Small and Rosen 1981). State 0 here is when the gasoline price is 
at the base of $2 per gallon, and other states are as gasoline prices rise. (See Hau 
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(1987) for a more complete discussion comparing this and other welfare change 
measures within the discrete choice framework.) 
Dividing by the marginal utility of money converts units of “utils” (the measure 
between brackets in equation [1]) into units of money. The CV produces an aver-
age welfare change per trip in units of 1/λ, or money, per trip. This is the main 
welfare change calculation. Dividing these average welfare changes into the gas 
price increase per trip gives reveals what fraction of the gas price change is “passed 
through” to the average commuter. In a system with no alternative to the auto-
mobile, the fraction “passed through” would always equal 1. To understand the 
difference in effects across income groups, different λs are used to correspond to 
the different income groups, since it is a common finding is that λ is a strong func-
tion of income (Jara-Diaz et al. 1989; Morey et al. 2003; Morey et al. 2003a). 
The calculation assumes that total sum of demand from all modes is fixed, since 
we are modeling the choice and expected welfare for one trip and need to keep 
the trip rates equal for the needs of the CV calculation. In reality, some travel will 
be forgone as prices rise. 
Mode Choice Model 
A binary mode choice model between automobile and public transit was used to 
keep the choice mechanism simple. A mode choice estimation adapted from Ben-
Akiva et al. (1985) was used to provide reasonable utility function coefficients. The 
coefficients, shown in Table 1, result from a study performed in Washington, D.C. 
in 1968 by Cambridge Systematics (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). The marginal 
utilities of money (bus and auto out-of -pocket costs) were updated from 1968 
to 2008 values using the CPI. The updated values of time equal roughly $4.79 for 
in-vehicle time and $16.47 for access time per hour. (Values using the transit cost 
disutility were slightly higher.) While this simple model includes only automobile 
and bus modes, it will be used only to illuminate relationships and not to predict 
any specific ridership changes in corridors with more complex transit options. 
The marginal utility of auto out-of-pocket costs (B4) from the utility function was 
used as the overall marginal utility of money for the CV (i.e. λn) calculation. In 
the cases where different income levels are explored, different λs are used, to be 
explained shortly.
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Table 1. Utility Function Coefficients for Binary Mode Choice Model
 
Coefficient Auto Bus Comment
 B1 1.454 0 Constant offset
 B2 -0.00897 -0.00897 In-Vehicle Time (min)
 B3 -0.0308 -0.0308 Access Time (min)
 B4 -0.00187 0 Auto Out of Pocket Cost (cents)
 B5 0 -0.00115 Transit Out of Pocket Cost (cents)
 B6 0.77 0 Household auto ownership Dummy (for auto only)
 B7 -0.561 0 CBD Dummy - 1 if work is downtown, 0 otherwise  
    (for auto only)
 
Corridor Scenarios 
The corridor scenarios are idealized commute scenarios represented by param-
eters developed by the author based on reasonable assumptions. The parameters 
used to represent the levels of service for automobile and bus in the corridors sce-
narios are presented in Table 2. A one-way, 10-mile commute is used as the repre-
sentative trip. The “Low-Transit” (herein called “Low”) scenario is a case where the 
trip by automobile is much faster than by public transit. The “Medium-Transit” 
(herein called “Medium”) scenario represents a case corridor where travel times 
are similar for the two modes and mode shares are fairly balanced. In the “High-
Transit” (herein called “High”) scenario, transit performance is higher than auto-
mobile, where congestion and parking add to the costs of automobile commuting. 
Automobile fuel economy varies by scenario since travel speeds and efficiency will 
differ by levels of congestion. 
While the mode choice model was originally estimated for bus and automobile 
only, the high-transit scenario represents a level of performance probably only 
achievable with a rail-like bus service, such as bus rapid transit. We assume that the 
choice process between these higher performance transit options and automobile 
retain the same characteristics. 
Note that the scenarios represent corridors where automobile levels of service and 
public transit levels of service result from the long-term development of the cor-
ridor. The scenarios are entirely different, where automobile levels of service are 
good with low congestion and inexpensive parking, and transit service is minimal. 
Likewise, in corridors with heavy congestion and high parking costs, there are 
competitive public transit services. The significant differences among the three 
corridors help to illustrate the interactions between price, choice, and welfare. 
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After an analysis of these scenarios, the impacts of incremental policy changes on 
the “Low” scenario are discussed. 
Table 2. Input Values for the Three Corridor Scenarios
 
  Low- Medium- High-  
  Transit  Transit Transit
 Variable “Low” “Medium” “High”
One-Way Trip Length (miles) 10 10 10
Automobile Fuel Economy (miles per gallon) 25 20 15
Gallons Used (calculated from fuel economy) 0.40 0.50 0.67
Transit Fare (cents)  150 150 150
Automobile Parking Price (dollars) 0 5 10
Automobile In-Vehicle Speed (mph) 30 20 15
Automobile In-Vehicle Time (calculated from speed) 20 30 40
Transit In-Vehicle Speed (mph) 10 20 30
Transit In-Vehicle Time (calculated from speed) 60 30 20
Automobile Access Time (min) 5 10 10
Transit Access Time (min) 25 10 5
CBD Dummy  1 1 1
Automobile Ownership Dummy 1 1 1
Comparing Welfare Changes for Different Incomes 
It is understood that the marginal utility of money declines with rising incomes 
(resulting, in effect, from higher values of time, etc). Here, low-income commuters 
were represented by doubling and high-income commuters were represented by 
halving the marginal utilities of money (parameters B4 and B5) of the middle-
income commuters. The three scenarios were then run separately for these three 
different consumers. 
Model Limitations
There are many limitations of such a simple scenario model. The model treats only 
marginal effects. Some commuting costs are “lumpy,” such as parking and transit 
passes, which may temper their value in daily decision making. There also may be 
significant second-order effects, such as a change in subsidy or taxation needed 
to provide for changing demand for public transportation. Similarly, it is assumed 
that fuel prices and congestion are exogenous to the system being modeled. That 
is, rising gasoline prices, which lead to a falling demand for automobile travel, do 
not feed back to stabilize prices. Likewise, falling automobile demand does not 
feed back into lowered congestion and travel times. 
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Temporal issues also are not represented. The lag between gasoline price changes 
and mode choice changes, the length of time a new mode is used, and the interac-
tion between these temporal issues and the quality of the transit options are not 
represented.
Drivers also may have other options to reduce welfare losses by changing the way 
they commute. For one, they may chain trips en route to work, join a carpool, or 
avoiding motorized travel by telecommuting, cycling, or walking. In the longer 
term, they may purchase more efficient vehicles or move closer to work. In this 
way, this simple model of a single constrained commute trip represents an upper 
bound on welfare losses. 
While the age of the choice model may lead to a question of its validity, the 
simple scenario analysis here depends mainly on the basic utility relationships and 
tradeoffs between time and out-of-pocket costs, which are likely fairly stable. For 
example, as shown below, the elasticities of demand for transit with respect to 
gasoline price are around 0.1 to 0.3, right in the range found in the literature. (For 
a discussion of the transferability of choice models between times and places, see 
McFadden and Talvitie (1977, pp 393-394.) 
Results: Welfare Changes Across Scenarios
Figure 2 shows the predicted mode choices for the three scenarios as gas prices 
rise. As expected, automobile mode share is very high and remains fairly static 
as gas prices rise under the Low scenario. The Medium scenario sees some mode 
choice shift, though the High-Transit scenario shows the most flexibility as auto-
mobile mode choice declines by nearly 1/3 over the range of gas prices. Transit 
ridership elasticities for the three scenarios are 0.15, 0.23, and 0.28 for the High, 
Medium and Low scenarios, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Automobile mode choice for the three scenarios
 
Figure 3 shows the predicted welfare changes for the commuter for the three 
scenarios as gas prices rise. Welfare losses are highest under the Low scenario, 
since gas prices affect nearly all of the average commuters, and few can switch to 
transit without major increases in travel times. The Medium scenario sees smaller 
losses, and the High scenario shows the least losses of the three. Interestingly, the 
Medium and High scenarios still show significant losses because the lower fuel effi-
ciency for drivers means that gas price changes affect remaining drivers more than 
in the Low scenario. Nonetheless, at $6 per gallon, the welfare losses of the average 
commuter living in a corridor with excellent transit are 46 percent less than for the 
commuter with poor transit options. 
It is evident that the Low scenario “passes through” the highest fraction of the gas 
price increase of the three scenarios (Figure 4). These fractions track closely with 
the automobile mode shares, but do not decline because of the higher fuel use 
(lower fuel economy) in the Medium and High scenarios. 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2010
12
Figure 3. Welfare changes for the three scenarios
 
Figure 4. Fraction of price increase passed through to average commuter 
for the three scenarios
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Results: Welfare Changes for Different Income Levels
Here mode choice, welfare change, and gas price “pass-through” will be compared 
for three income levels between the Low, Medium and High scenarios. 
Mode Choice
Automobile mode share remains high and static as gas prices rise for all three 
income groups (Figure 5[a]) under the Low scenario. The imbalance in modal 
performance creates few outlets for any of the income groups to escape higher gas 
prices. Even though the low-income commuter is more willing to switch to transit 
because of higher cost sensitivities, the low quality of transit service prevents most 
from doing so. 
Figures 5(b) and 5(c) show automobile mode shares for the Medium and High 
scenarios, respectively. In both scenarios, high-income commuters are much more 
likely to drive, but all three groups switch in significant numbers to transit as gas 
prices increase. The low-income group, already heavily transit users at low prices, 
end up cutting their automobile use by over 30 percent when gasoline reaches $6 
per gallon. 
Welfare Changes
Under the Low scenario, similarly to mode shares, all three income groups lose 
substantial welfare as gas prices rise (Figure 6[a]). There is a very small separation 
between groups at high prices as some low-income travelers switch to transit. 
Under the Medium and High scenarios, low-income commuters more readily 
avoid gas prices increases by using transit and are affected less than the higher 
income groups who remain driving (Figures 6[b] and 6[c]). 
Gas Price “Pass-Through”
At $6 per gallon, the gas price increase is 160, 200, and 267 cents per driving trip 
for the Low, Medium and High scenarios, respectively (due to differing assumed 
driving fuel economies). Figure 7(a) shows the equivalent fraction of gas-price 
“pass-through” for the different commuters in the Low scenario. It is near the 
maximum for all of the commuters, as few are able to switch to transit. In the 
Medium and High scenarios, since groups are less dependent on automobiles, the 
“pass-through” is reduced (Figures 7[b] and 7[c]). The low-income group, avoiding 
gas prices by taking transit, ends up seeing very little of the gas price increase in the 
scenario with better transit options. 
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Figure 5. Automobile mode choice for the three income groups for the  
(a) Low, (b) Medium, and (c) High scenarios
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Figure 6. Welfare changes for the three income groups for the (a) Low, (b) 
Medium, and (c) High scenarios
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Figure 7. Fraction of gas price increase “passed through” to commuters of 
different income levels for the (a) Low, (b) Medium, and (c) High scenarios
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Impacts of Incremental Changes to the Low Scenario
While the scenarios represented systems where auto and transit levels of service 
differed greatly, the impacts of immediate policy changes to a particular corridor 
are also important. While no claim is made in this exploration to produce calcula-
tions needed to make policy recommendations or evaluations, a brief analysis of 
incremental changes to a scenario can point to some basic conclusions about the 
impact of transit service investments on welfare. Here, we took the Low transit 
scenario and reduced the expected access time from 25 minutes to 15 minutes 
and increased the average speed from 10 to 15 miles per hour. These are the kinds 
of outcomes expected from adding service frequency and operations improve-
ments such as queue jumps, signal priority or limited-stop services. Automobile 
parameters (costs, levels of service) remain unchanged. Table 3 compares the 
welfare measures from the Low scenario to a scenario with these modifications at 
a gasoline price of $6 per gallon. The incremental changes do show a significant 
effect on mode choice, welfare losses and pass through with losses falling by about 
five percent for all income groups. 
Table 3. Comparing Outcomes of Low Scenario to Modified Low Scenario 
for a Gasoline Price of $6
 
Scenario   Low   “Modified” Low
Income Group Low Medium High Low Medium High
  Income Income Income Income Income Income
Automobile Mode Choice 89.0% 91.4% 92.4% 83.2% 86.7% 88.2%
Welfare Loss  146.36 147.96 148.67 138.95 141.28 142.33 
(Cents per Trip) 
Gas Price Pass-Through 91.5% 92.5% 92.9% 86.8% 88.3% 89.0%
(% of Gasoline Price Change) 
Conclusions
This paper discusses, using a simple scenario model, what happens to per-trip 
costs under rising gas prices for travelers with different travel choice character-
istics and incomes. Commuters with reasonable choices, where travel and access 
times for public transit were competitive with the automobiles, could avoid higher 
fuel prices by switching travel modes and incur smaller welfare losses than com-
muters in corridors where public transit options offer significantly lower levels 
of service. Commuters with poor choices were forced to pay the higher prices or 
switch modes and incur much longer trip times and welfare losses. These results 
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verify what one would expect to be the impacts of constrained choices under cir-
cumstances of rising prices and confirm the hypothesized conclusions laid out in 
the beginning of this paper. 
In the “Low-Transit” scenario, nearly all of the low-income commuters were unwill-
ing to switch modes to transit and incurred the same welfare losses as higher-
income commuters. In effect, low-income commuters suffered more, as their loss 
as a share of their income is likely much higher than that for the high-income com-
muters. The High scenarios allowed low-income commuters an escape to avoid 
high gasoline prices while not incurring much longer travel times.
These scenarios illustrated significant impacts of travel choice on welfare under 
changing fuel prices. Further exploration of these issues is warranted, both for the 
concerns of low-income job access discussed earlier but also to understand how 
commuters in general can face likely future gas price increases without incurring 
large welfare losses from a lack of travel choices. 
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